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In this Article, Dean Baker examines the compatibility of multilateral
environmental agreements with the provisions of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The author discusses the key provisions of
the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Waste, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the

Ozone Layer, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, and the GATT. The author then reviews the conflict between
unilateralenvironmental protection and open andfree trade under the
GATT. The author concludes the collective interests represented by international environmental agreements, and the agreements themselves,
should provide a refutable presumption of validity and GATT compatibility to the extent they are relied upon to justify a state's seemingly unilateral actions to protect the environment.
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INTRODUCTION

Surprisingly, there is a neglected topic in the current debate as to
whether the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' (GATT) helps
or hinders environmental protection.2 It is the role of multilateral environmental treaties, specifically those addressed to global environmental
problems, to justify trade measures against charges of protectionism and
GATT incompatibility.' A better understanding of this role will help to
resolve the supposed conflict between the GATT's goal of open, nonprotectionist international trade and environmental treaties that attempt to
restrict or ban the trade of environmentally harmful products.

1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION (Louis B. Sohn ed., 1986), 650 ff
[hereinafter GATT].
2. A sampling of articles outlining the debate includes: John H. Jackson, World
Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1227 (1992); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Agora: Trade and Environment, Free
International Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict? 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 700 (1992); Geoffrey W. Levin, The Environment and Trade-A
MultilateralImperative, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 231 (1992); David Palmeter, Environment and Trade, Who Will Be Heard? What Law is Relevant?, 26 J. WORLD
TRADE 34 (1992); Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT
Article XX, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 37-55 (1991) ("Many environmental organizations...
believe that the GATT views ecosystem protection as a nettlesome non-tariff barrier
instead of an overriding goal.") Or, as the GATT Secretariat perceives its detractors'

views: "Others argue that the unrestricted trade can be harmful to the environment,
especially when a country's environmental policies are weak or non-existent." Report on
"Trade and the Environment," GATT Doc. 1529, Feb. 3, 1992, at 2 [hereinafter
GATT Report].
3. Ted L. McDorman in The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to
Stop Drflnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24 GEo. WAsH. J.
INT'L L. & EcON. 477, 507 (1991), certainly raises the topic and acknowledges that
certain import embargoes may contain "a conservation-environmental value that is part
of an international regime." In concluding that such trade measures are largely GATTincompatible, however, his discussion focuses primarily on United States legislation relevant to the question, while this paper examines certain international environmental
agreements in more detail. James Cameron & Jonathan Robinson, The Use of Trade
Provisions in InternationalEnironmental Agreements and Their Compatibility With
the GATT, 2 Y.B. INV'L ENvrL. L. 3 (1991), provides a useful summary of such provisions and analyzes their GATT compatibility, but deals less with the role of the agreements in justifying applied trade measures.
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A 1992 Report4 of the GATT Secretariat addressed the growing, if
not erroneous, perception that the free trade principles embodied in the
GATT contradict environmental protection goals. The intent of its message was clear: to show that the GATT champions liberal world trade;
that liberal world trade helps the environment; and, therefore, that
GATT defends the environment.' The Report identified trade barriers,
especially unilateral measures, as inefficient "greening" tools that can
subject environmental causes to "being exploited by [trade] protectionists."' The Report argued further that multilateral cooperation is preferable to unilateral actions,7 and that any multilateral environmental
agreement aspiring to GATT compatibility cannot discriminate between
parties and nonparties. 8
Are protectionist trade measures such as import bans by individual
countries acceptable under the GATT if they are based on a multilateral
agreement to protect the environment? A complete answer to this question is important because multilateral agreements, some with trade restrictions or prohibitions, are becoming firmly established as the primary
4. GATT Report, supra note 2.
5. The GATT Report's accompanying press release begins: "Increased world trade
leads to higher per capita incomes, and with that the freedom and incentive to devote a
growing proportion of national expenditure to the environment." Id., press release at 1.
The Report identifies supporting economic arguments made in other contexts, including:
Michael Rauscher, Foreign Trade and the Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL SCARCITY, at 17 (Horst Seibert ed., 1991) ("Does international trade contribute to the deterioration of environmental quality? In economic theory, the link has traditionally been
weak."); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, in Trade Policy, Environmental Policy and the

GATT, Aussenwirtschaft, 46 JAHRGANG 197-221 (1991) (Heft II, Zurich), argues that

liberal trade does not per se harm the environment.

THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE

IssuEs (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1992), often cited in the GATT
Report, contains a variety of economic analyses of the relationship between trade and the

environment.
6. GATT Report, supra note 2, at 5.
7. Id. at 3.
8. The restrictions on trade with nonparties contained in the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer illustrate the perceived conflict of GATT goals
with environmental protection. Montreal Protocol, Sept. 16, 1987, S.Treaty Doc. No.
10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987), amended and
adjusted S. Treaty Doc. No. 4, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), -eprinted in 30 I.L.M.
539 (1991) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. The
GATT Report criticized the Montreal Protocol, considered to be among the most successful models for dealing with global environmental problems: "[Tihe parties to the
Montreal Protocol ...could have structured the Protocol ...without the necessity of
including provisions for special restrictions on trade with non-parties." GATT Report,
supra note 2, at 12.
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means for dealing with global environmental problems such as ozone depletion and climate change. Although the existence of multilateral agreements has not yet played a decisive role in any GATT Panel Report,
their significance bears analysis.9
Trade-related provisions in three multilateral environmental agreements (dealing, respectively, with hazardous waste, ozone depletion, and
climate change) are briefly examined in Part II of this Article, which
also describes how these recent treaties affect the earlier-concluded
GATT. Part III then outlines basic GATT principles, paying particular
attention to how Article XX of the GATT can be applied to environmental protection. Part IV reviews the role of international agreements
generally in the settlement of trade disputes through the GATT Panel
Report process and in one case arising under the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement. Part V measures the multilateral environmental
agreements against these GATT Panel results.
This Article concludes by addressing the questions of whether and
how states carrying out trade obligations under multilateral environmental agreements can simultaneously comply with the GATT. This inquiry
needs to be distinguished from the closely related (and more frequently
discussed)' 0 issue of how the GATT regards efforts by individual states

9. Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development acknowledges the essential relationship between open economic systems, trade policy measures,
and international consensus, without referring specifically to international environmental
agreements:
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic
system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all
countries, to better address the problems of environmental degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbi-

trary or unjustifiable discriminationor a disguised restriction on international
trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.

The Rio Declarationon Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Principle 12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1
(1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (emphasis added).

10.

See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy, Internationaler Handel und nationaler

Umweltschutz: Eine Abgrenzung im Lichte des GATT, 3 Eu. Z.W. 243 (1992);
Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 52-53. See also Jan Klabbers, Jurisprudence in International Trade Law, Article XX of GATT, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 63, 64 (1992), an article
which "is basically concerned with one single question: how has Article XX been interpreted by the various GATT panels?"; Petersmann, supra note 5; C. Ford Runge,

Trade Protectionism and Environmental Regulations: The New NontariffBarriers, 11
Nw. J. INrT'L L. & Bus. 47 (1990).
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to enforce domestic environmental standards against other members of
the world community." Both inquiries are essential to coordinating
global environmental protection with the equally important and integrally related goals of economic growth and open world trade. 2

II.

TRADE PROVISIONS IN MULTILATERAL TREATIES CONCERNING
HAZARDOUS WASTE, OZONE DEPLETION, AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Trade restrictions have long been used to protect domestic environmental interests1 3 and have appeared in recent years in international environmental agreements. 4 Two of the three international environmental
treaties discussed in this section-the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal"
and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer"-contain trade provisions representing the range of trade measures available to date in the realm of multilateral agreements to protect

the environment. The third treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,17 attempts to draft GATT compatibility

11. This issue was highlighted by the 1991 GATT Panel Report criticizing the
United States embargo of Mexican tuna fish. United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, Report of the GATT Panel, Aug. 16, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991)
[hereinafter Mexican Tuna Panel Report].
12. For an analysis of trade protectionism that is provocative, albeit not directly related to environmental questions, see V. Curzon Price, Treating Protection as a Pollution Problem or How to Prevent GATT's Retreat from Multilateralism, in A NEw
GATT FOR THE NINETIES AND EUROPE '92 (T. Oppermann &

J.

Molsberger eds.,

1991).
13. Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 39; Cameron & Robinson, supra note 3, at 7. The
increasing overlap between domestic and international environmental policy is highlighted by one author's observation that in the United States in one recent congressional
period alone, the 101st Congress (1989), at least 33 environmental bills were introduced
"that would restrict international trade or affect international trade policy," although few
were actually enacted. Levin, supra note 2, at 232.
14. The GATT Report identifies 127 multilateral environmental agreements between 1933 and 1990, of which 17 contain some form of trade provision. The GAIT
Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade is studying these trade provisions as they relate to GATT obligations. GATT Report, supra note 2, at 10.
15. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Waste and Their Disposal, 28 I.L.M. 649 (entered into force May 5, 1992) [hereinafter
Basel Convention].
16. Montreal Protocol, supra note 8. See Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments
and Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537.
17. Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Framework on Climate Change, 5th Sess., second
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into its basic assumptions. Whether any of these agreements are in fact
GATT compatible will be discussed in Part V; their trade provisions are
outlined here simply for reference.
A.

The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal18

The objectives of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, as stated
in its Preamble, include the protection, "by strict control, of human
health and the environment against the adverse effects which may result
from the generation and management of hazardous wastes and other
wastes." Parties have at least two obligations related to trade. Article
4.1(a) acknowledges a party's right to prohibit the import of hazardous
wastes, requiring it to notify other parties of any such decision. The
Preamble also recognizes this right: "[Any State has the sovereign right
to ban the entry or disposal of foreign hazardous wastes and other wastes
in its territory." Article 4.5 provides that -a "[plarty shall not permit
hazardous wastes or other wastes to be exported to a non-Party or to be
imported from a non-Party." The Convention provides no further details
or requirements regarding the import and export bans; each state party

decides how it will structure, implement, and enforce them.
International trade provisions are only one part of the Basel Convention's larger scheme to control the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes. States must also act to reduce the domestic production of wastes.
Both types of actions are required to meet the goals of the Convention.
Each party must ensure that "the generation of hazardous wastes and
other wastes within it is reduced to a minimum" 19 and that "the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and other wastes is reduced to
the minimum consistent with the environmentally sound and efficient
' 20
management of such wastes."

part, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC 237/18 (part II) (1992), revised by U.N. Doc. A/AC 237/
18 (part II) Add. 1/Corr. 1 (1992).
18. Overviews of the Basel Convention can be found in Mary Gade, Hazardous
Substances and Waste, 1 .Y.B. INT'L ENVL. L. 155 (1990); Katharina Kummer, The
InternationalRegulation of Transboundary Traffic in Hazardous Wastes: The 1989
Basel Convention, 41 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 530 (1992).
19.

Basel Convention, supra note 15, art. 4.2(a).

20.

Id. art. 4.2(d).
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B. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer
The Montreal Protocol21 attempts to reduce the level of ozone-depleting substances ("controlled substances") 2 2 in the earth's atmosphere. The
Preamble states that the parties to the Protocol are "[d]etermined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it, with the ultimate
objective of their elimination." The Protocol employs a system of consumption and production limitations for parties to the Protocol 23 as well
as measures limiting trade in controlled substances with nonparties.2 4
The trade measures in question include Article 4.1, which provides
that "each Party shall ban the import of controlled substances . . from
any State not party to this Protocol." Different substances are banned
under different timetables. Under Article 4.2, effective January 1, 1993,
parties must ban the export of controlled substances to nonparties. In the
future, the import from nonparties of products containing controlled substances must be banned, 25 and, if feasible, products from nonparties produced with, but not containing, controlled substances might be subject to
an import ban.26 Parties already are obligated to discourage the export to
nonparties of technology for producing and using controlled substances.2 7
Significantly, under Article 4.8, nonparties that can prove compliance
with the Protocol receive the same trade treatment as parties in compliance. Thus, the Protocol does not distinguish between parties and non-

parties, but between, on the one hand, states that meet certain standards

21. The Montreal Protocol has generated substantial literature. For a small sample,
see, e.g., RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY (1991); Geoffrey Palmer, New
Ways to Make InternationalEnvironmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 274-77
(1992); John W. Kindt & Samuel P. Menefee, The Vexing Problem of Ozone Depletion
in InternationalEnvironmentalLaw and Policy, 24 TEX. INT'L L. J. 261 (1989); Dale

S. Byrk, Note, The Montreal Protocol and Recent Developments to Protect the Ozone
Layer, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (1991); Annette M. Capretta, Note, The Future's
So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades: Future Impacts of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 211 (1988).
22. Controlled substances, defined in Article 1.4 of the Protocol, include fifteen forms
of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), three forms of halons, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl
chloroform. Montreal Protocol, supra note 8.
23. Id. arts. 2-3.
24. Id. art. 4.
25. Id. art. 4.3.
26. Id, art. 4.4.
27. Id. art. 4.5.
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set by the Protocol, regardless of their party status, and, on the other
hand, nonparty states that do not meet those standards.
C.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

The Climate Change Convention, integrally connected with the 1992
United Nations Rio Conference on Environment and Development, consciously attempts to weave together the Conference's central themes of
development and environment, to which trade is necessarily connected.28
Because it is designed as a framework for subsequent and more specific
protocols and legal instruments, the Convention requires no specific
trade measures of its parties. Nevertheless, a brief consideration of certain provisions is still useful, in part because they lay the groundwork

for future efforts to draft GATT compatibility into measures to combat
climate change.
Article 3.5 of the Climate Change Convention is taken verbatim from
GATT Article XX but omits one phrase. 29 GATT Article XX prohibits
measures that "constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade." Article 3.5 does not contain the
limiting language "where the same conditions prevail." 3
28. Rio Declaration, supra note 9. Paragraphs 8 & 10 of the Conventions's Preamble, for example, almost mirror Principles 2 & 11 of the Rio Declaration. See infra note
29 and accompanying text.
29. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849
[hereinafter Climate Convention]. Article 3.5 reads: "Measures taken to combat climate
change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitraryor unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade." (emphasis
added). This language also appears in Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration. See Rio Declaration, supra note 9.
30. GATT-specific references proposed at the drafting stage were not, however, included in the final draft. Such proposed language that was not included in the Convention appears in the proposed Article 2.6: "States shall promote an open and balanced
multilateral trading system. Except on the basis of a decision by the Conference of the
Parties which should be consistent with the GATT, no country or group of countries
shall introduce barriers to trade on the basis of claims related to climate change." Climate Change Convention, Part I, UN/Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992) (proposed). Proposed
Article 2.7 read: "Measures taken to combat climate change should not introduce trade
distortions inconsistent with the GATT or hinder the promotion of an open and multilateral trading system." Id. The only influence of this proposed language in the final draft
is found in Article 3.5 of the Climate Convention which, in addition to the GATTparallel language cited in the text accompanying this footnote, provides that "The Parties
should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system." Climate Convention, supra note 29.
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The Convention also contains general indications that the states have
an interest in economically effective solutions to the greenhouse gas problem."1 It recognizes the importance of "social and economic development
in an integrated manner with a view to avoiding adverse impacts on the
latter, '32 as well as the need for cost-effective policies and measures "to
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost."33 To the extent
GATT principles can be convincingly presented as supporting these
goals, the policymakers who will implement the Climate Convention will
have bases for integrating GATT-compatible concepts into future protocols and other documents. Integration of GATT principles into this process is important since these documents will likely serve as the testing
ground and model for multilateral legal solutions to global environmental problems well into the future.
D.

Environmental Agreements as Lex Posterior

The Basel Convention, the Montreal Protocol and, when it comes into

force, the United Nations Climate Change Convention are all "successive
treaties" to the GATT under Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties.3 4 As lex posterior, these agreements have priority
over the GATT to the extent their provisions are GATT-incompatible
when all states involved are parties to both the GATT and the later
agreements; thus, among such parties the GATT-inconsistent provisions

31. The European Energy Charter, executed at the Hague on December 17, 1991,
goes much further in indicating its intent to be GATT-compatible. One objective is "development of trade in energy consistent with major relevant multilateral agreements such
as GATT [and] its related instruments." European Energy Charter, 13 ENERGY L.J. 1,
17 (1992) (Title 1.1). Further, parties ensure that "non-discriminatory access to local
and international markets for disposal of [Energy Materials and Products] can be...
provided through the operation of market forces and through elimination of barriers to
trade." Id. (Title 3.5); see also Rudolf Lukes, Die Europaische Energiecharta, 13
EUROPXISCHE ZErrsCHRiF-r FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 401 (1992).

32. Climate Convention, supra note 29, pmbl.
33.

Id. art. 3.3.

34. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signatureMay 23, 1969,
155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
The GATT entered into force on Jan. 12, 1948, the Montreal Protocol on Jan. 1, 1989,
and the Basel Convention on May 5, 1992; the Climate Change Convention is not yet in
force. Technically, because the VCLT came into force after the GATT, it does not apply
per se to the GATT, but the relevant rules regarding successive treaties apply it as
customary law. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 719 n.108. See also Gwen Beacham, International Trade and the Environment: Implications of the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade for the Future of Environmental Protection Efforts, 3 CoLo. J.
INT'L ENvrL. L. & POL'y 655, 688-670 (1992).
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basically constitute exceptions to the GATT.3 5 These exceptions, as between these parties, however, are largely irrelevant to the Basel Convention or the Montreal Protocol. Their trade measures are either to be
applied only against nonparties 8 or, in principle, pursuant to rules to
which other parties have already agreed." Further, because the GATT
already has a carefully structured system for allowing exceptions to
GATT requirements, in theory it should not be necessary to rely on
exception by lex posterior. Whenever possible, use of the GATT excep-

tion mechanisms is preferable. The GATT requires trade measures arising from the treaties to be either GATT-compatible or justified to the
extent they are not.
Only when GATT contracting parties are not party to the agreement
in question does GATT compatibility of obligations arising under trade
provisions in environmental treaties become an issue. Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a GATT contracting party that is
not a party to the relevant treaty can assert its GATT rights against any
treaty provision it believes to be GATT inconsistent.38
III.

BASIC GATT PRINCIPLES

The basic GATT principles of eliminating trade barriers and promoting nondiscrimination between its contracting parties lie behind the criticism of certain multilateral environmental treaties. The GATT Secretariat criticized the Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, and the

35. The VCLT, supra note 34, provides in part: "4. When the parties to the later
treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one: (a) As between States parties to
both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3 [i.e., the earlier treaty applies only
to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty]; (b) As
between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the
treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations."
VOLT, supra note 34.
Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 719, provides a detailed analysis under the VOLT regarding how obligations under a treaty that comes into force subsequent to the GATT
might affect GATT obligations. When two GATT contracting parties are also parties to
the subsequent treaty, incompatible later provisions are "exceptions to the GATT," and
when only one of the two GATT contracting parties is party to such later treaty,
"GATT obligations remain." McDorman, supra note 3, at 508, also discusses the "exception" status of later international agreements. Cameron & Robinson, supra note 3, at

16, deal with determining priority between the GATT and international environmental
agreements.
36. Basel Convention, supra note 15, art. 4.5; Montreal Protocol, supra note 8, arts.
4.1., 4.2, 4.5.
37. See, e.g., Basel Convention, supra note 15, art. 4.1.
38. VOLT, supra note 34, art. 4(b).
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Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species *of Wild
Fauna and Flora39 for specifying "a difference in the trade measures
affecting parties and nonparties." 40 This criticism is somewhat premature since the trade provisions, standing alone, cannot be challenged
under the GATT; they must first be applied by an individual state. It is
also not clear that this anticipated difference between parties and nonparties in fact constitutes either an illegal trade barrier or discrimination
when understood in light of the relevant GATT principles and
exceptions.
A. Elimination of Trade Barriers
A basic purpose of the GATT is to eliminate illegal trade barriers
between its contracting parties. GATT Article XI(1) prohibits contracting parties from applying trade "prohibitions or restrictions other
than duties, taxes or similar charges" on products imported to or exported from other contracting parties. However, trade restrictions otherwise prohibited by Article XI may be allowed under Article XI(2) or
under the Article XX general exceptions to the GATT.
1. Article XI(2) Permissible Quantitative Restrictions
GATT Article XI generally disallows quantitative restrictions on exports and imports. Exceptions are permitted, inter alia, for temporary
prohibitions or restrictions "applied to prevent or relieve critical
shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party."4 At first glance, this provision appears to offer the potential protection of the export bans to nonparties contained in the Basel
Convention and the Montreal Protocol. On closer examination, however,
little overlap of interests exists. First, the long-term measures contem39. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 1,
1975) [hereinafter CITES]. Schoenbaum considers CITES to be GATT-incompatible to
the extent a CITES party applies trade measures to protect natural resources outside its
jurisdiction. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 720.

40. GATT Report, supra note 2, at 11.
41. GATT, supra note 1, art. XI(2)(a). Although Article XI(2) contains three
grounds for exceptions, only XI(2)(a) has potentially relevant application to the environmental measures considered in this Article. Article XI(2)(b) relates exclusively to classification, grading, or marketing of commodities. Article XI(2)(c) deals only with restrictions and therefore is not relevant to the measures in the Basel Convention and the
Montreal Protocol, which are prohibitions rather than restrictions. Further, the application of Article XI(2)(c) is itself sharply restricted. See Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at n.
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plated under both treaties are not likely to qualify as temporary. Second,
neither treaty deals with "products essential to the exporting party." It is
hard to argue that hazardous waste is either essential to or in critical
shortage in those countries banning its export under the Basel Convention, unless the waste product results from production of another good
that itself is essential to the country. The Montreal Protocol export ban
of CFCs and other controlled substances is no more likely to be excepted
under GATT XI(2)(b) as involving an essential product. The ban is
certainly being applied to prevent a critical shortage of an item, ozone,
that is essential to the CFC exporting country. But whether ozone is a
"product" is debatable since it is not produced by human beings. The
GATT system is probably not yet ready to recognize that a healthy
ozone layer could itself be considered a product, in effect reinvigorated to
a healthier state by human efforts to reverse earlier anthropomorphic
harm to the same good.
2.

Article XX General Exceptions

Exceptions to GATT rules, including the prohibition against trade
barriers, are also possible under Article XX for trade measures that have
purposes such as protecting public health, conserving exhaustible natural
resources, and acquiring products in short supply. These exceptions are
subject to several conditions, many of which relate to the basic GATT
principle of nondiscrimination.
B.

Nondiscrimination.

Nondiscrimination is a central element of the GATT system"2 and is
embodied in the provision of "most-favoured-nation" status43 and "national treatment"** for all contracting parties. For the purposes of ana42.

JOHN H. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELA-

400 (1977).
43. GATT Article I provides in part:
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation... any advantage,favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contractingparty to any product originating in or des-

TIONS

tined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to
the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contractingparties. (emphasis added).
GATT, supra note 1, at 651.
44. GATT Article III's "national treatment" requires that the treatment of imported
products be "no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use."
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lyzing trade measures arising from environmental treaties, the GATT's
most pertinent nondiscrimination provisions are contained in Article XX.
At least two Article XX exceptions offer potential support of environmental protection measures.4 5
As will be seen in Part IV, several GATT Panel Reports have discussed what kinds of measures can qualify as exceptions under these two
headings. Whether the measure in question has a purpose that fits under
either of these two subsections is the first question to be answered in
determining whether it qualifies for an Article XX exception. Then, the
requirements of the "preamble" to Article XX may be considered. The
preamble to Article XX excepts only measures that "are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discriminationbetween countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on international trade" (emphasis added).
1. States in Which the Same Conditions Prevail
The first step in determining if a measure is unacceptably arbitrary or
discriminatory is to consider whether "the same conditions prevail" in
the states concerned. Presumably, if different conditions prevail in two
states, the states may be treated differently. In the case of trade measures
arising under an environmental treaty, a highly relevant comparison of
conditions is whether both states are party to the treaty in question, or
are at least applying its standards.46 A state which applies the standards
of an international environmental agreement creates different conditions
45. Article XX allows measures: "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health" [Article XX(b)]; or "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption," [Article XX(g)]. Apparently, drafters considered applying Article
XX(g) expressly to measures made effective in conjunction with international agreements. In fact, "the original reference to 'international agreements' in Article XX(g) was
dropped in the Geneva draft." Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 44. Had it remained, obligations under environmental treaties would have provided further grounds for exceptions to
the GATT, but its removal does not preclude application of Article XX to measures
arising from international agreements if they meet all other Article XX requirements.
46. Petersmann, supra note 5, at 217, has asked whether the "where same conditions
prevail" language should be read to "imply that trade restrictions (such as those in the
1987 Montreal Protocol discriminating against countries with lower environmental standards) might be justifiable under GATT Article XX?." On the other hand, as to the
"differences in social conditions, economic and political interests between industrialized
and developing countries prevent[ing] the establishment of rules uniformly applicable to
all of them," see Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Third World and the Protection of the
Environment, in ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL, HOMENAJE AL PROFESSOR
MIAJA DE LA MUELA-I 351-53 (1979).
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for protection of the environment than one which does not. In comparing
conditions, presumably other factors such as population, level of development, and available natural resources would also be considered.47
2.

Arbitrary and Unjustifiable Discrimination

If the same conditions are found to prevail in two states, the trade
measure itself must be examined. If the measure discriminates on justifiable and nonarbitrary bases (and serves a purpose specified in Article
XX) then it is closer to being compatible with the GATT. Domestic

measures enacted to carry out environmental treaty obligations can withstand charges of "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination." Far from
being arbitrary, environmental treaties typically contain statements of
purpose. These purposes may even relate directly to the trade measures
that the treaty employs. For example, the Basel Convention Preamble
refers specifically to a state's right to ban the entry of foreign hazardous
waste. A domestic trade measure that explicitly or implicitly incorporates
the purposes of the treaty on which it is based strengthens its own
nonarbitrary character.
As to whether a measure is justifiable under Article XX, the broad
international consensus behind the treaties is a strong justification for the
trade measures that they engender. The treaties embody the well-considered, negotiated compromises of their signatories on how best to address
the enviroiimental problem in question. The depth of scientific, diplomatic, legal, and other talent and resources behind a multilateral agreement such as the Basel Convention or the Montreal Protocol gives added
justification to trade measures arising from them. 48 The fact that the
agreements and, in principle, the trade measures are subject to review
for effectiveness49 is further evidence that they are justifiable and
nonarbitrary.

47. Whether the same conditions prevail in different states has evidently never posed
enough of an issue to have been discussed in a GATT Panel Report. Charnovitz, supra
note 2, at 47.
48. For a description of the myriad players and processes involved in negotiating an
international environmental protection treaty, see, e.g., Benedick, supra note 21; Kum-

mer, supra note 18, at 533.
49. Basel Convention, supra note 15, art. 15.5; Montreal Protocol, supra note 8, art.
11.4(a); and Climate Convention, supra note 29, art. 7.2(e). These agreements all require the parties to consult periodically as to the effectiveness of their respective
agreements.
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Application of Measures

Determining how a trade measure is applied is the last step in concluding whether it is permissibly discriminatory. Recall that Article XX
requires that "such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" (emphasis added). The Basel Convention is criticized as discriminatory on its
face simply because it makes a distinction between parties and nonparties. 50 Article 4.5 provides that a "[p]arty shall not permit hazardous
wastes or other wastes to be exported to a non-Party or to be imported
from a non-Party." In fact, these distinctions should be more correctly
evaluated for their effect as applied, rather than automatically judged as
GATT-incompatible on the surface.5 1 It is conceivable that the application of a trade measure under Article 4.5 could be far more discriminatory than the content of the measure itself.52
4.

No Disguised Restrictions on Trade

A final Preamble condition for measures allowed under Article XX,
although not directly related to nondiscrimination, is that these measures
cannot be "a disguised restriction on international trade." The limited
remarks from GATT panels on this requirement have treated the provision quite literally. Basically, if the enacting state announces the existence of a measure, it is treated as not disguised.53 Given the GATT
concern that environmental measures may be exploited by trade protec-

50. GATT Report, supra note 2, at 11-12.
51. See Klabbers, supra note 10, at 93: "[I]t [is] the application of measures rather
than the measures themselves which [need] to be examined" (emphasis added). Klabbers
identifies the source of this distinction as the Panel Report in United States-Importsof
Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, BISD 30S/107, report adopted on May 26,
1983. Id.
52. Assume, for example, that States X, Y, and Z are all parties to GATT, but that
only X is party to the Basel Convention. Pursuant to the Convention, X enacts an import
ban of waste oils from all nonparties. If X enforces the ban against Y but not against Z,
i.e., allows imports from Z but not from Y, it discriminates in the application of the same
trade ban. This violates not only Article XX but the Basel Convention itself, in that the
Convention prohibits parties from importing controlled wastes from nonparties. A party
can (indeed, under art. 4.5, must) ban imports from nonparties regardless of whether it

invokes its "right" under Article 4.1(a) "to prohibit the import of hazardous wastes."
Basel Convention, supra note 15, arts. 4.1 & 4.5. Article 4.1 makes no distinction between parties and nonparties; it simply requires a party to notify other parties that it has
decided to exercise that right.
53. The disguised restriction limit is "leniently interpreted as transparency" in Panel
Reports. Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 48.
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tionists, relevant tests are needed to reveal disguised restrictions.5 A determination of the "genuine conservation reasons" behind a measure
may help to distinguish disguised trade restrictions from measures that
should really be excepted under Article XX.5 5
IV.

GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PANEL REPORTS RELATING TO
THE ENVIRONMENT OR TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

The trade provisions contained in the Montreal Protocol and the Basel
Convention have not yet been challenged in a GATT dispute settlement
procedure, perhaps because these agreements only recently have entered
into force (1989 and 1992 respectively). This procedure is used when
one or more contracting parties decide to test whether their GATT benefits are being "nullified or impaired ' 56 by the acts of another contracting
party. When consultation, as mandated by Article XXII, with the alleged offender does not resolve the disagreement, the contracting parties
may establish a panel to consider the complaint, under rules developed
pursuant to Article XXIII(2).
The following Part of this Article examines the Mexican Tuna Panel
Report in detail and summarizes relevant points from other GATT
Panel- Reports5" and a Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement

54. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 716, draws on a Court of Justice of the European
Community Case, Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607, to suggest
that trade measures which are not proportional to their purposes may be disguised trade
restrictions. The court upheld a Danish ban on nonreturnable containers, but found quotas on nonapproved containers to be disproportional to the law's purpose. Id.
55. See infra part IV.C., for a more complete discussion of the dispute settlement
process which gave rise to the "genuine conservation reasons" language under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement.
56. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII. For a history of the GATT dispute settlement
procedure, see generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD
TRADE DIPLOMACY 52 (2d ed. 1990).
57. Mexican Tuna Panel Report, supra note 11. The others are: Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes Panel, GATT Doc. DS10/R

(Nov. 7, 1990), GATT, BISD 37th Supp. 200 [hereinafter Thai Cigarette Panel Report]; Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon Panel,
GATT Doc. L/6268 (Mar. 22, 1988) [hereinafter GATT Herring/Salmon Panel Report], BISD 35th Supp. 98; and United States-Prohibition of Tuna and Tuna Products
from Canada, GATT Doc. L/5198 (Feb. 22, 1982), BISD 29th Supp. 91 [hereinafter
Canadian Tuna Panel Report]. A fifth GAT Panel Report perceived by many as relevant to the environment-the United States Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances Report, GATT Doc. L/6175 (June 17, 1987) BISD 34th Supp. 136-makes
no specific references to international agreements and, accordingly, is not discussed in
this paper.
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Panel Report, 8 which relate, at least in part, to environmental issues.
These Reports often are discussed in the context of investigating when a
domestic measure to protect the environment can be excepted from the
GATT. They are examined here, however, to address a more specific
inquiry, namely: what role multilateral treaties addressed to global environmental problems should play in generally justifying trade measures
carried out pursuant to those treaties.5 9
A preliminary answer is that such agreements can "GATT-justify"
the trade measures to which they give rise because the measures cannot
be classified properly with typical unilateral measures. 60 The GATT, to
be consistent with its professed interest in multilateral solutions to environmental problems,"1 must allow the strength of the international consensus behind the respective agreements6 2 to speak for GATT compatibility of their ensuing trade measures, provided that the measures
otherwise meet GATT requirements. At this point, the trade measures
allowed or required by the treaties can only be implemented through
individual states. This does not mean, however, that they are purely domestic measures. On the other hand, a state should not be able to hide
behind the shield of a treaty to justify any trade measure. Otherwise,
such a measure would be a disguised restriction.

58. In the Matter of Canada'sLanding Requirementfor Pacific Coast Salmon and
Herring,Final Report of the Panel, Oct. 16, 1989, panel established under Ch. 18 of the
Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States [hereinafter FTA Landing Requirement Report]. This Report relied on provisions of the FTA that parallel the
GATT, having arisen following the GATT Herring/Salmon Panel Report, supra note
57.
59. This Article discusses only those panel reports that have an environmental component; other reports may exist that speak to how the GATT views the relationship
between international agreements and domestic measures based on those agreements.
60. ELISABETH ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH US LEGIs(1985), however, is concerned with their unilateral nature. Id. at 87. Charnovitz,
supra note 2, distinguishes between "environmental trade restrictions pursuant to an
LATION

international agreement ... [and] restrictions conceived and carried out unilaterally,"
although he concludes that the former enjoy no "greater GATT blessing." Charnovitz,
supra note 2, at 54. He believes the only bases for asserting special status for the former
would be by the Contracting Parties granting a waiver under GATT Article XXV or
recognizing the precedence of a widely accepted environmental treaty. Id.
61. See GATT Report, supra note 2, at 3.
62. See supra text preceding note 50.
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A.

United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna 63

The Mexican Tuna Panel Report resulted from a proceeding requested by Mexico following a 1990 United States embargo of Mexican
yellowfin tuna under the United States Marine Mammal Protection Act
(the MMPA). 6 4 The United States claimed to be acting to protect dolphins harmed by the fishing methods employed by Mexican commercial
fishing boats in harvesting yellowfin tuna.65 The MMPA requires a ban
on the importation of fish or products from fish caught with "commercial
fishing technology" that results in the incidental killing or serious injury
to ocean mammals in excess of United States standards. 6 The MMPA
specifically bans the import of yellowfin tuna unless the harvesting gov7
ernment shows that its standards compare to United States standards.
The Panel Report concluded, inter alia, that this United States application of the MMPA and the relevant statutory provisions of the
MMPA themselves violated the GATT Article XI(1) prohibition on
trade restrictions. The provisions and their application also could not be
excepted under Article XX(b) or XX(g).6 8
The United States had argued that the embargoes were necessary
under Article XX(b) to protect dolphins outside United States jurisdiction because no alternative means of dolphin protection were reasonably
available. Mexico, on the other hand, pointed out that alternative,
GATT-consistent means were available, "namely international co-operation between the countries concerned." 9 The Panel concluded that, prior
to imposing the embargo, the United States had not exhausted other options to protect the dolphins, especially "the negotiation of international
cooperative arrangements, which would seem to be desirable in view of
the fact that dolphins roam the waters of many states and the high
O

seas."M

63.
64.
65.
66.

Mexican Tuna Panel Report, supra note 11.
Codified in part at 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
Mexican Tuna Panel Report, supra note 11, para. 3.33.
16 U.S.C. § 101 (a)(2).

67. 16 U.S.C. § 101(a)(2)(b).
68. The Report, which was submitted to the Parties on August 16, 1991, is not likely
to be voted on by the GATT Council. Mexico and the United States have since settled
with a compromise agreement on June 15, 1992. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, n. 13. See
David J. Ross, Making GATT Dolphin-Safe: Trade and the Environment, 2 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 365 (1992) (for earlier indications that Mexico had decided not
to pursue acceptance of the Report).
69. Mexican Tuna Panel Report, supra note 11, para. 5.24.
70. Id. para. 5.28.
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1. International Cooperative Arrangements
Perhaps feeling constrained from commenting on a situation that was
not before it (i.e, since no international dolphin agreement existed), the

Panel passed up an opportunity to state specifically that such an international cooperative arrangement in fact would provide the kind of justification necessary for a measure to be excepted under Article XX(b). The
Panel commented only on the invalidity of the domestic law as a basis
for the ban 7 ' and failed to discuss satisfactorily whether there existed an
international justification for the measures. This failure is significant
since both the United States and Mexico referenced treaties in the attempt to legitimate their respective positions. The United States unsuccessfully referred to the CITES in an attempt to show that treaties can
require parties "to prohibit the importation of products in order to protect endangered species found only outside its jurisdiction. '7' But, as
Mexico pointed out, the dolphins in question were not listed by the
CITES as endangered. 3
At this point the Panel should have clarified what the result would
have been had the dolphins in fact been so endangered. It should have
led to acceptance of the trade ban as an internationally supported measure. A measure enacted specifically pursuant to an obligation in a multilateral agreement to protect a species or resource should be considered
to represent more than a mere domestic interest, even though the measure is enacted-as it must be-by means of a domestic law. If that domestic measure takes its inspiration from a "cooperative agreement," a
certain level of validity based on the cooperative purpose of the agreement should be presumed, even if only one state is acting under the relevant treaty at any given time. This presumption does not mean that the
measure is automatically exempt from meeting all of the other Article
XX requirements, but simply that it strengthens the claims for
exemption.
This notion of cooperative purpose holds true in the face of the

Panel's critique of unilateral actions by one state to enforce its domestic
environmental standards outside its jurisdiction. The Panel rejected the
United States claim that the import bans and the MMPA provisions on
which they were based "served solely the purpose of protecting dolphin
life and health and were necessary [under XX(b)] ... in respect of the
71. Id. para. 5.29.
72. Id. para. 3.36. The United States also referred to the Law of the Sea Convention
(to which it is not a party) and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission as proof
that "the need to conserve dolphin [sic] was recognized internationally." Id. para. 2.40.
73. Id. para. 3.44.
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protection of dolphin life and health outside its jurisdiction. 7 4 The
Panel apparently understood the broad interpretation proposed by the
United States to be an interest in enforcing domestic environmental standards in areas outside of its jurisdiction, a practice which the Panel
clearly felt violates GATT rules. However, under the idea that when a
state acts under specific multilateral treaty obligations (which was not
the case here), cooperative purpose could help to transform a unilateral
action into one that is informed by and even, to the extent the treaty sets
standards, enforces international standards.
The GATT Panel understood the essential question to be whether a
GATT party may act under Article XX(b) to protect "human, animal
or plant life or health" outside its jurisdiction or only within its jurisdiction. The Panel answered this question narrowly, unfortunately relying
on the GATT drafting history, which it viewed as indicating that Article
XX(b) was intended to protect health only "within the jurisdiction of the
importing country."17 5 One problem with the Panel's argument is that
the awareness of transboundary global environmental problems, basically
ignored during the drafting process almost fifty years ago, must be taken
into account in considering how natural resources are affected today.
The Panel, in spite of having itself recognized the sometimes tenuous
nature of borders by acknowledging that "dolphins roam the waters of
many states and the high seas,' '7 failed to give any more credence to the
74. Id. para. 5.24. The Panel commented:
[I]f the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by the United States were

accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health
protection policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate without
jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement. The General Agreement
would then no longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade among all
contracting parties but would provide legal security only in respect of trade between a limited number of contracting parties with identical internal regulations.
Id. para. 5.27 (emphasis added).
75. Id. para. 5.26. McDorman believes that Article XX exceptions should be limited
to protection of environmental goods within the acting state's jurisdiction, McDorman,
supra note 3, at 520, including among his supporting sources a quotation from the
GATT authority John H. Jackson, who acknowledges that the Article XX(b) language
"is not explicitly restricted to health and safety of the importing country" but then concludes that "it can be argued that that is what Article XX, means." Id. (emphasis
added) (quoting JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 209 (1989). McDorman does not, however, make clear that in the same paragraph Jackson also acknowledges that "[it might be possible to argue the contrary." JACKSON, supra. Such a
"contrary" argument that Article XX can apply to environmental protection outside the
acting state's jurisdiction is strengthened when that state's measures are backed by an
international treaty obligation.
76. Mexican Tuna Panel Report, supra note 11, para. 5.28.
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transboundary realities of many contemporary environmental problems.
The question that in fact needs to be asked is whether, and to what
extent, a GATT party can protect human, animal, or plant life or health
outside its territorial jurisdiction if the protecting actions have their bases
in an international agreement to which the acting state is party. Because
the text of Article XX(b) provides no specific language on this point, a
decision must be based on a weighing of national and international interests in protecting the environmental good in question. Legitimately
grounded .protective actions should be GATT-acceptable whether they
are based on national laws or on international laws that have become a
part of the acting state's national legal system.
More precisely formulated, the question is why the national protection
of legal objects within a state's jurisdiction should be considered as a
GATT-compatible, nonprotectionist trade restriction, when the national
protection of the same object is unacceptable under the GATT the moment it swims, flows, or otherwise moves outside the acting state's jurisdiction. Why, for example, can the United States protect a gray whale
within its Exclusive Economic Zone7 7 but not when it is twenty meters
outside of that zone?
The decisive factor in national actions to protect the environment is
not whether the protected good lies inside or outside the national jurisdiction, but whether a legal order to protect the environmental good exists that is agreed upon by the parties involved. If this legal order exists,
then actions based upon it are no longer arbitrary or at least are no
longer automatically presumed to be so. A measure supported by the
existence of this legal order is still subject to other GATT requirements.
The important point, however, is that the international justification for
the measure can provide an equally or even perhaps more valid basis
than the national interests that have to date been the focus of GATT
panel reports.

77. The United States may protect the gray whale as a species threatened with extinction under Appendix I to the CITES, supra note 41, as implemented in the United
States by the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988) or the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988). This legislation provides for a direct ban on
imports of the endangered species in question (e.g., the gray whale), as opposed to banning the import of one species or product (e.g., tuna) to protect another species (e.g.,
dolphin). As McDorman points out, the treatment of endangered whales is "governed by
CITES, not the International Whaling Convention." McDorman, supra note 3, at 509.
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Article XX(g)

The Mexican Tuna Panel's discussion of whether the United States
embargo was justified under Article XX(g) is especially pertinent to the
GATT's interaction with environmental treaties. Article XX(g) exempts
measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption" (emphasis added).
The United States measures evidently failed to qualify for exemption
under Article XX(g) on at least two grounds. First, the exhaustible resource protected by the United States measures was dolphin, not tuna,
and the relevant law banned the import of tuna. Importing dolphin, the
exhaustible resource arguably protected by the MMPA, was not banned.
This point was of concern to several contracting parties that submitted
comments 8 as well as to the Panel, which unfortunately did not clearly
enunciate the reasons for its concern.
The second Article XX(g) test which the United States tuna ban
failed to meet deals with the extraterritorial reach of the embargo. Article XX(g) requires that measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources be taken "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." Here, the Panel refers to the 1988
GATT Herring-Salmon Panel Report, 9 which found that "a measure
could only be considered to have been taken 'in conjunction with'" production restrictions "if it was primarily aimed at rendering effective
these restrictions." 8 This conclusion standing alone would not qualify a
trade measure enacted by a state pursuant to an environmental treaty for
exemption under Article XX(g), to the extent the measure had effects
beyond the state's jurisdiction. But the Panel later noted that adoption of
its report would not affect the right of contracting parties "acting jointly
to address international environmental problems which can only be resolved through measures in conflict with the present rules of the General
Agreement." 8 1 Does this mean that joint action under an environmental
78. Mexican Tuna Panel Report, supra note 11, paras. 4.8 (Canada), 4.14 (EEC),
4.19 (Japan), 4.21 (Norway), 5.15, 5.30 (Panel).
79. GATT Herring/Salmon Panel Report, supra note 57.
80. Id. para. 4.6 (emphasis added). The Mexican Tuna Panel Report states:
A country can effectively control the production or consumption of an exhaustible
natural resource only to the extent that the production or consumption is under its
jurisdiction. This suggests that Article XX(g) was intended to permit contracting
parties to take trade measures primarily aimed at rendering effective restrictions
on production or consumption within their jurisdiction.
Id. para. 5.31 (emphasis added).

81.

Mexican Tuna Panel Report, supra note 11, para. 6.4. Australia, submitting
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treaty would help to justify any conflict with the present GATT rules?
The Panel only hinted at this but refused to consider that perhaps a
country can effectively control exhaustible natural resources outside its
own jurisdiction. That is, in fact, what states do by engaging in agreements like the Basel Hazardous Waste Convention and the Montreal
Ozone Protocol. 82 In the Panel's insistence that this control can only be
GATT-compatible if it is done cooperatively with other nations, perhaps
it unwittingly acknowledged that the very status of being party to a multilateral environmental agreement effectively expands the jurisdiction of
all states party to the agreement beyond traditional conceptions of territorial jurisdiction.
B.

CanadianMeasures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring
and Salmon (1988)83

In the Canadian Unprocessed Herring and Salmon dispute settlement
procedure, Canada relied directly on its international obligations to protect species as a justification for restricting the export of unprocessed herring, sockeye salmon, and pink salmon. Canada argued that the restrictions "constituted an integral part of a complex and longstanding system
of fishery resource management" that had "evolved in response to the
Federal Government's domestic and internationalresponsibility for the

management and development of the sea coast
conservation, allocation,
84

''
fisheries of Canada.
The Panel recognized that national and bilateral stock conservation
and management efforts had been "embodied, inter alia, into various

written comments as an interested Contracting Party in the Mexican Tuna Panel process, also recognized the importance of international frameworks for justifying trade measures with extraterritorial application, making a useful distinction as to a GATT Panel's

competencies: a Panel "could not resolve conflicts" between a party's obligations under
GATT and other conservation instruments. "Controls on trade flows necessary to give
effect to international conventions, for instance on narcotics, should be considered as incidental to GATT obligations." However, "where a contracting party takes a measure
with extraterritorial application outside of any international framework of cooperation,"
a Panel could appropriately analyze the measure for compatibility with GATT obligations. Mexican Tuna Panel Report, supra note 11, para. 4.1.
82. Regarding this aspect of the Ozone Protocol, see Betsy Baker, Eliciting NonParty Compliance with MultilateralEnvironmental Treaties: U.S. Legislation and the
JurisdictionalBases for Compliance Incentives in the Montreal Ozone Protocol, 35
GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 333 (1993).

83. GATT Herring/Salmon Panel Report, supra note 57.
84. Id. para. 3.5 (emphasis added). Canada made further reference to "international
agreements" in general, as set out in paragraphs 3.27 and 3.37 of the Report.
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bilateral and multilateral treaties and conventions relating to fisheries."'85
Yet, the Panel's only decisive statement on international agreements ba-

sically excludes them from the Panel's scope of review.8" The Panel rejected Canada's export restrictions because they were "contrary to Article XI:1 and were justified neither by Article XI:2(b) nor by Article
XX(g)."' 7 Canada subsequently removed the export restrictions but replaced them with landing requirements, which then became the subject
of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Landing Require88
ment Panel Report.
C. The 1989 Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement Panel
Report on Canada'sLanding Requirementfor Pacific Coast Salmon
and Herring8 9
The Panel in this case, established under the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) rather than under the GATT, 0 offers
perhaps the most helpful analysis of the relationship between GATT
rules and measures arising under international agreements to protect the
environment. The FTA incorporates many provisions of the GATT verbatim, including Article XI:19 1 and Article XX.92
As mentioned, the Landing Requirement Panel grew out of the 1988
GATT Panel Decision on Unprocessed Salmon and Herring, in which

85. Id. para. 2.5.
86. The Report stated:
Canada referred in its submissions to international agreements on fisheries and the
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Panel considered that its mandate was
limited to the examination of Canada's measures in the light of the relevant provisions of the General Agreement. This report therefore has no bearing on questions
of fisheries jurisdiction.
Id. para. 5.3.
87. Id. para. 5.1.
88. Without affecting the Panel's decision, the United States also mentioned international agreements, but only to point out that "other international agreements did not
modify obligations under the General Agreement," GATT Herring/Salmon Report,
supra note 57, para. 3.40, and that presumably the international agreements on which
Canada was relying, e.g., the Inter American Pacific Tuna Convention, should not modify GATT obligations either. The argument was too general to allow a determination of
whether the lex posteriorrule applied to whichever international agreements the United
States may have had in mind.
89. FTA Landing Requirement Report, supra note 58.
90. The FTA allows for dispute settlement under either the GATT or the FTA.
The parties here chose the latter option.
91. FTA Landing Requirement Report, supra note 58, art. 407.
92. Id. art. 1201.
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the Panel found no justification under Article XX(g) for Canada's export restrictions. Canada subsequently enacted new landing requirements calling for "off landing" of the salmon and herring at a shore

station where biological sampling, catch reports, and other "conservation" data could be gathered.93 Only then could the shipments continue
to their next destination, be it processing or unprocessed exportation to
the United States.
Canada based its data-collecting activities in part on the Pacific
Salmon Convention of 1985, which requires the parties, inter alia, to
prevent overfishing and to cooperate in management and research.9"
Canada referred to no specific international agreement regarding herring, but claimed a general right derived from its status as a coastal state
under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention to conserve and manage the
herring and salmon resources. It argued that "the right to require the
landing of the catch is linked to conservation under that Convention." 95
The United States complained of the extra time, product deterioration,
and costs imposed by the landing requirement. It argued that the landing
requirement served no useful conservation purpose and therefore was not
"primarily aimed at" conserving the herring and salmon stocks,9 8 noting
that "Canada's data-collection justification had been rejected" by the
1988 GATT Panel.
The FTA Panel readily concluded that the landing requirement was a
restriction within the meaning of GATT Article XI(1) on the "sale for
export" of herring and salmon. In deciding if the measure was excepted
from GATT rules, the Panel's most detailed inquiry was whether the
landing requirement was "relating to the conservation of" the natural
resource in question. The Panel observed that it "was not the intention
of Article XX(g) to allow the trade interests of one state to override the
legitimate environmental concerns of another."9' 7 Then the Panel determined whether a measure is "relating to the conservation of" the natural
resource in question by asking if "there is a genuine conservation reason for choosing the actual measure in question as opposed to other
measures that might accomplish the same objective." Although no panel
has made the connection, examining the conservation reasons behind a
measure is one possible test of whether it is a disguised trade restriction
under Article XX's Preamble.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

FTA Landing Requirement Report, supra note 58.
Id. para. 4.04.
Id. para. 5.04.
Id. para. 5.03.
Id. para. 7.05.
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The Panel concluded that ultimately the test is that "if the measure
would have been adopted for conservation reasons alone," Article XX(g)
allows a government to use it.9" If an international environmental agreement that has conservation or environmental protection as its very purpose is the reason a domestic measure is enacted, that would seem to
allow its use under Article XX(g). Indeed, the existence of an international environmental treaty should lend support to the position that the
measure was adopted for conservation reasons alone.
The Panel finally concluded that the landing requirement could have
been structured more selectively, and that one hundred percent of the
catch did not need to be landed to obtain sufficient data for conservation
management purposes.99 Conservation management, however, is a substantially different goal, which requires less comprehensive coverage of
the resource in question" than the goal of prohibiting as much transboundary movement of hazardous waste as possible, or reducing production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances as far as technically
feasible. This suggests that looking to the purposes of the international
environmental agreement in question may be relevant. The Panel, curiously, showed little interest in analyzing the purposes of the Pacific
Salmon Treaty and paid only passing attention to the purposes of the
Canadian landing legislation.1"'
D.

Thailand's Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes
on Cigarettes101

In the Thai Cigarette Panel Report, Thailand relied on purely domestic grounds for its import ban on United States cigarettes. Nonetheless,
the Panel's discussion in the Report of what is necessary under Article
XX(d) relates to the validity of international environmental treaties as
justification for otherwise GATT-incompatible trade measures. The
Panel points out that Article XX(d) provides an exemption for measures
which are "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
which are not inconsistent" with GATT provisions. 0 2 Although not an-

98. Id. para. 7.07.
99. Id. para. 7.38.
100. Id. para. 4.04.
101. Thai Cigarette Panel Report, supra note 57.
102. Id. at 223. The Thai Cigarette Panel cited an earlier panel report to elaborate
on the meaning of "necessary":
A contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with other GATT provisions as "necessary" in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which it
could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other
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swered by any panel report, the question arises, if a country is bound
international agreement obligations to impose trade restrictions, is
"alternative measure" even available? The answer arguably depends
how much leeway the international agreement gives to the party in
fecting trade provisions.
E.

by
an
on
ef-

United States Prohibitionof Imports of Tuna and Tuna
Productsfrom Canada103

In the 1982 Canadian Tuna Panel Report, the United States relied
extensively on its obligations under international fisheries treaties1 ' to
attempt to justify its ban of Canadian tuna imports under the United
States Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (the FCMA).
It pointed out to the Panel that the purpose of the Act was, inter alia,
"to support and encourage the implementation and enforcement of international fishery agreements for the conservation and management of
highly migratory species, and to encourage the negotiation and implementation of such agreements as necessary." 10 5 The Panel simply noted
the language in its "Findings and Conclusions," making no comment as
to whether an international agreement can justify import bans, and noting further that FCMA Section 205 "contained provisions designed to
discourage other countries from seeking to manage tuna unilaterally."' 6
Canada pointed out that the IATTC never specified a management regime (implying that the United States was simply choosing its own
methods of complying with the IATTC) and indeed concluded that "the
United States prohibition of Canadian tuna imports contributed in [no]
way to improved conservation." ' This is a notably different situation
from when a convention obligates parties to take more specific forms of
action, such as when the Basel Convention requires parties, inter alia, to
ensure reduction to a minimum of hazardous waste generation, 0 8 not to
GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure
consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting
party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that which

entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions.
Id. at 74 (emphasis in original) citing United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, GATT Doc. L/6439, para. 5.26 (adopted on Nov. 7, 1989).

103. Canadian Tuna Panel Report, supra note 57.
104. E.g., Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTG) and the Interna-

tional Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). Id. para. 3.10.
105. Id. para. 4.5.
106. Id. para. 4.5.
107. Id. para. 3.15.
108.

Basel Convention, supra note 15, art. 4.2(a).
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export hazardous waste to areas which have banned its import, 0 9 and
not to permit its export to or import from a nonparty,"O notwithstanding
that the form of the export ban is not specified in the Convention."'
In the end, the Panel decided that the United States ban of Canadian
tuna was not consistent with GATT Article XI, in part because the
Panel had received "no evidence that domestic consumption of tuna and
tuna products had been restricted in the United States."" 2
V.

GATT

COMPATIBILITY: THE BASEL CONVENTION AND
MONTREAL PROTOCOL

The Mexican Tuna Report indicated that, in addition to domestic legislation, the United States relied more on an amorphous sense of international obligation to protect the environment, rather than on any specific
treaty obligation in applying domestic measures to protect dolphins by
banning imports of yellowfin tuna. In the future, should a contracting
party be faced with having to defend trade measures based on the Montreal Protocol or the Basel Convention, it must articulate more specifically the international obligations on which it relies.1 1 3 Only a specific
reliance on these treaties will allow them to play a larger role in the
panel dispute settlement process or in the GATT system generally.
Measured against the requirements of the Preamble to GATT Article
XX, parties' obligations in the Basel Convention and Montreal Protocol
lay the groundwork for trade measures that can be GATT-compatible.
The treaties' distinction between parties and nonparties does not merit
the criticism of GATT incompatibility because the very condition of being a party or nonparty to either treaty creates an acceptable basis for
determining that the same conditions do not prevail in two states. Also,
the purpose and multilateral consensus behind the treaties protect their
trade measures from charges of being arbitrary or unjustifiable. How

109. Id. art. 4.2(e).
110. Id. art. 4.5.
111. See supra part II.A., and the discussion regarding Article 4.5 of the Basel
Convention.
112. Canadian Tuna Panel Report, supra note 57, para. 4.11. Recall that to be
excepted under Article XX(g) from GATT rules, measures relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources must be "made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption."
113. Of course states are interested in the appearance, if not the reality, of maintaining the independence of their own national interests from any other single or collective

authority. In the context of environmental protection, Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 717,

discusses the implications of states with relatively strong standards agreeing to a lower
collective standard.
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they are applied will be more determinative of their arbitrariness, a
judgment that cannot be made until measures are enforced.
The Montreal Protocol, like the Basel Convention, distinguishes on its
face between parties and nonparties. Under Article 4 of the Protocol,
controlled substances may not be exported from or imported to nonparties. Nevertheless, on closer examination, the distinction made by the
Montreal Protocol for purposes of applying trade bans is not between
parties and nonparties, but between those states that comply with the
Protocol standards and those that do not." 4 Similarly, under Article X of
CITES, parties may trade with nonparties that provide documentation
which "substantially conforms" to convention requirements. Under the
reasoning that parties applying the same treaty thus constitute states in
which the same conditions prevail, the Montreal Protocol distinction between compliers and noncompliers is not unacceptable discrimination
under GATT Article XX. However, because the Basel Convention has
no similar option for nonparties to receive the same treatment as parties,
it is more open to charges of discrimination under the Preamble to
GATT Article XX.
Analyzing the Basel and Montreal agreements for possible exemptions
under Article XX(b) or XX(g), according to GATT panel report decisions, trade measures must be primarily aimed at rendering effective restrictions on domestic production or consumption within the jurisdiction
of the acting state. The import and export ban of wastes against nonparties in Article 4.5 of the Basel Convention certainly meets this test in
that it is primarily aimed at rendering effective the Article 4.2 restrictions on the generation of hazardous wastes. Banning imports and exports helps to ensure minimized transboundary movement of the wastes.
With regard to the Article 4.2(a) restriction on the domestic generation
of wastes, standing alone, the export ban is clearly aimed at rendering
that restriction effective. However, a determination of whether the import ban is "primarily aimed at" rendering domestic generation restrictions effective would have to consider whether the import ban would
instead encourage domestic production. With a product such as hazardous waste, it is conceivable that if a company within one state has particularly advanced technology for hazardous waste disposal, it may want to
encourage generation domestically to make up for the loss of business
from disposing of imported waste.
The import and export bans in Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol are
clearly aimed at rendering domestic consumption and production of con-

114.

See discussion of Montreal Protocol, supra note 8.
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trolled substances effective. Without the bans, the detailed obligations in
Article 2 for each party to reduce and eventually eliminate its production
and consumption of controlled substances would be largely ineffective.
The criticism still stands that measures other than trade bans could have
reached this same result.11 5 Any analysis using the "necessity" test of
whether a state "could reasonably be expected to employ" other measures should consider that a state should reasonably choose the quickest,
most effective method to diminish global dangers such as ozone depletion." 0 Environmental economists must determine if trade bans are the
most effective means to that end.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The collective interest behind multilateral environmental treaties provides strong justification for GATT compatibility of trade measures arising under those treaties. Even the GATT Panel that criticized unilateral
United States trade bans on Mexican tuna acknowledged the importance
of cooperative agreements for dealing with natural resources (and by implication, damages thereto) that, in effect, know no national boundaries.
This concept should be expanded in GATT decisionmaking so that a
trade measure exercised by an individual state in reliance on or under
obligation to an international environmental agreement is no longer presumed to be prima facie protectionist but is given a presumption of
GATT compatibility. This presumption should not, however, exempt
the measure from having to meet other appropriate GATT requirements. To encourage the contracting parties' acceptance of such a presumption, GATT compatibility of trade provisions in international
agreements should be taken seriously by lawmakers even when there is
no possibility of a legal challenge from a GATT contracting party not
bound to such agreements. Attention should focus not so much on how
the party challenged can rely on environmental treaty obligations to provide exceptions to its GATT responsibilities. Rather, a more important
task is to construct ways for those treaty obligations and GATT obligations to support each other and strengthen trade relations so as to improve the environment. This will require honest and regular expert eval-

uation of the effectiveness of both the environmental treaty provisions
and the environmental aspects of the GATT and resulting revisions"

7

to

115. See supra note 8.
116. Regarding the necessity test generally, see supra note 102 and accompanying
text.
117. Regarding amendment of the GATT, see Beacham, supra note 34, at 679;
Cameron & Robinson, supra note 3, at 18; Eliza Patterson, GATT and the Environ-
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better harmonize the two systems when necessary. The review mechanisms already provided in the Basel, Montreal, and Climate Change
agreements1 18 should lead to revisions of the trade mechanisms themselves if they are found to be counterproductive to their goals. The
GATT is also in the process of evaluating its own environmental
effectiveness., 9
All of these processes should be informed by the goals and the consensus of international opinion underlying both the GATT and environmental treaties, which are not, after all, diametrically opposed. Both can
work toward protecting the environment in a world sufficiently free of
trade barriers to allow economies at all levels to support a healthier
planet.

ment: Rules Changes to Minimize Adverse Trade and Environmental Effects, 26 J.
WORLD TRADE 99, 107 (1992); and Ross, supra note 68, at 358.
118. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
119. Witness the activation of the Environmental Working Group (supra note 14)
and the proposed Draft on Domestically Protected Goods, GATT Doc. L/6769, Code
#90-1760; GATT Doc. SR.47/2, which would obligate Contracting Parties not to export goods they ban domestically, with possible specific acknowledgment of rights under
the Basel Convention and Montreal Protocol. See Patterson, supra note 117, at 103 n.
18.

